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Teacher Dismissal: A View From Mount Healthy . 
E. Gordon Gee* 
Eleven years have passed since Warren E. Burger was sworn 
in as Chief Justice of the United States. The Burger years have 
been some of the Supreme Court's most important in terms of 
resolving constitutional questions affecting public education. Yet 
one need only review this decade of litigation to ascertain that 
many of the Court's decisions have raised as many questions as 
they have answered.' The Burger years appear to represent, in a 
legalistic microcosm, a struggle taking place in society at  large 
between two conflicting forces. The collectivist goal of promoting 
equality of attitude and experience in an effort to advance social 
uniformity and national cohesion confronts the individualist 
goal of freedom of choice consistent with the cultural diversity 
of a pluralistic society.' This tension between individuals and 
the state, as represented particularly in the public school sys- 
tem, is found in many of the Burger Court rulings. Although 
there has been something for everyone in these cases, such eclec- 
tic decisionmaking makes difficult any attempt to identify con- 
sistent trends. Nonetheless, there are some fleeting images in the 
* Dean and Professor, College of Law, West Virginia University. B.A., 1968, Univer- 
sity of Utah, J.D., 1971, Columbia University; Ed.D., 1972, Teachers College, Columbia 
University. 
1. Although many cases appearing before the Supreme Court during the past decade 
have had a direct impact on educational institutions, some of the more important ones 
include the following: Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Abood 
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 US. 209 (1977); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); 
Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 430 US. 703 (1977); Runyon v. McCrary, 
427 U.S. 160 (1976); Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 
U.S. 482 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 
414 U.S. 632 (1974); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); San Antonio Indep. School 
Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 
1 (1971). 
2. For a discussion of these "tensions," see D. KRIP & M. YUDOF, EDUCATIONAL POL- 
ICY AND THE LAW (1974); Goldstein, Reflections on Developing Trends in the Law of 
Student Rights, 118 U .  PA. L. REV. 612 (1970); Project, Education and the Law: State 
Interests and Individual Rights, 74 MCH. L. REV. 1373 (1976). 
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fog worthy of examination. One decision that stands out with 
unusual clarity is the unanimous ruling in Mt. Healthy City 
School District Board of Education u. D ~ y l e , ~  decided January 
11, 1977. This case has been with us long enough to view how it 
fits into a possibly developing Court philosophy that attempts to 
reduce the tension between the collectivist and pluralistic 
factions. 
Mt. Healthy involved the rights of local school boards to 
dismiss teachers because of conduct that is constitutionally pro- 
tected. The case arose when the Mt. Healthy School District 
Board denied tenure to Fred Doyle. Doyle sued the school 
board, contending that the reason for the school board's action 
was his communication with a local radio station and that this 
communication was protected by the first amendment's freedom 
of speech guarantee. Doyle argued that because the school 
board's action violated his freedom of speech, his dismissal was 
improper. 
In light of the Court's ruling in Mt. Healthy, a detailed re- 
view of the facts is important. Doyle was hired by the school 
board under a one-year contract in 1966. He was rehired at the 
beginning of each of the next three years and received a two- 
year contract in 1969. Doyle was active in the local teachers' as- 
sociation and became its president in 1969. In 1970 he became a 
member of its executive committee. His terms in these positions 
were marked by tensions between the school board and the 
teachers' association. Furthermore, in 1970 he had an argument 
with a fellow teacher and an altercation with two cafeteria work- 
ers. Finally, he was accused of making an obscene gesture to two 
female students while on duty as a cafeteria monitor. All of 
these incidents were communicated to the school principal. 
The following year a controversy arose in the school district 
over a dress code for teachers. The principal at Doyle's school 
sent a memorandum concerning the dress code to his teachers. 
Doyle communicated the contents of this memorandum to 
WSAI, a Cincinnati radio station, which used the information as 
a local news item. One month after the radio station made pub- 
lic the contents of the memorandum, the superintendent recom- 
mended that Doyle not be rehired. The school board adopted 
3. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
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the recommendation. When Doyle was notified of the board's 
decision, he requested a statement of grounds for dismissal from 
the board. The board gave two reasons for the dismissal: the in- 
cident with the radio station and the obscene gesture. 
At trial the federal district court found that a substantial 
part of the reason for the board's decision was Doyle's communi- 
cation with the radio station. It further found that this commu- 
nication was protected by the first amendment.' Although inde- 
pendent reasons supported the board's decision to not grant 
tenure, the district court held that when a substantial part of 
the reasons were based on constitutionally protected conduct, 
the board's decision could not stand? The Sixth Circuit afiirmed 
the decision of the district court without rendering an opinion? 
Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted the school district's peti- 
tion for certiorari.' 
After dealing with questions of jurisdiction and local school 
district immunity from suit under the eleventh amendment, the 
Court turned to the substantive constitutional issues. Writing 
for the Court, Justice Rehnquist first enunciated the principles 
underlying the case. As an untenured teacher, Doyle could have 
been dismissed without reason and without a prior hearing.. But 
the Court also noted that teachers do not relinquish their first 
amendment rights as a matter of their employment and that 
teachers may be reinstated if the decision not to rehire them was 
made because they exercised those rights? 
Moving to its analysis of the case, the Court accepted the 
finding of the trial court that Doyle's communication with the 
radio station was protected speech.1° Justice Rehnquist insisted, 
however, that the analysis could not stop there. An additional 
question must be asked: If the board would have decided not to 
4. Id. at 283. 
5. In 1971, at the end of his two-year contract, Doyle was eligible for tenure. The 
denial of tenure a t  that time acted in fact as a dismissal. Id. at 283-84. 
6. Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 529 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1975), 
aff'd in part and vacated in part, 429 US. 274 (1977). 
7. 425 US. 933 (1976). 
8. 429 U.S. at 283 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)). Under the 
fourteenth amendment, expectation of tenure is not a property right. 
9. Id. at 283-84. 
10. Justice Rehnquist noted that a public employee's exercise of protected speech 
must be balanced with legitimate governmental interests in the efficiency of the services 
it offers. Because the school district had no enunciated policy regarding the alleged mis- 
conduct of Doyle, Rehnquist characterized the board's reaction to Doyle's conduct as ad 
hoc. Id. at 284. 
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rehire in the absence of the constitutionally protected conduct, 
does the fact that the protected conduct played a "substantial 
part" in the board's decision entitle Doyle to a remedy? The 
Court thought not, since a contrary conclusion would place the 
teacher who exercises his constitutional rights in a better posi- 
tion than one who does not: "The constitutional principle at 
stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is placed in 
no worse a position than if he had not engaged in the con- 
duct."" The Court concluded its opinion with instructions to 
the district court concerning the allocation of the burden of 
proof. The court held that teachers must prove that their con- 
duct was constitutionally protected and that this conduct was a 
motivating factor in the decision not to rehire. In turn, if the 
school board could prove by a preponderance of evidence that 
the same decision would have been reached in the absence of the 
protected conduct, the school board's decision would stand.'" 
Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgement of the court of 
appeals and remanded the case to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
Even though the Court at the outset stated the broad con- 
stitutional principles that governed the case, there should now 
be concern that it retreated from some of those principles in its 
final holding. In addition, a number of questions remain unan- 
swered after the decision. 
In order to gain a historical perspective on Mt. Healthy, one 
must reach back into the common law of employer-employee re- 
lationships. Under the common law an employer could discharge 
an employee for any reason at all. This rule prevailed in the 
United States until Congress began to alter private employment 
practices in legislation designed to protect unionization. One al- 
teration was the prohibition of discriminatory hiring and firing 
practices on the basis of an employee's freedom of association 
rights." But, while the private economic sector was significantly 
affected by this governmentally imposed national labor policy, 
governmental employment itself was generally controlled by a 
separate set of principles. This dichotomy of treatment stemmed 
11. Id. at 285-86. 
12. Id. at 287. 
13. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 $ 101, 29 U.S.C. 5 158 (1976). 
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from reliance on principles of constitutional interpretation 
rather than on any legislative enactments. 
The constitutional principles involved in the early treat- 
ment of governmental employment relationships provide, in 
themselves, historically important views of the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. For the greater part of its 
life in our jurisprudence, the due process clause was concerned 
with interests in life, liberty, and property. In cases involving 
"economic due process," the Court developed a definitional ap- 
proach to the scope of interests the due process clause protects. 
These interests were characterized as either "rights" or "privi- 
leges" and were accorded due process protection only if they fell 
within the definition of a right. Speaking of these rights in an 
early case, the Court described them as 
the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical re- 
straint of his person; [to] be free to use [all his faculties] in all 
lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his liveli- 
hood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avoca- 
tion and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may 
be proper.14 
This perception by the Court of due process rights resulted in 
the striking down of many attempts by state legislatures and 
Congress to regulate business, the economy, and the work envi- 
ronment." In viewing the personal ownership and use of prop- 
erty as the core of these rights, the Court could only conclude 
that any governmental regulation or interference with that per- 
sonal freedom was a deprivation of due process.16 
This definition of economic due process rights by the Court 
has remained virtually constant, although its view of governmen- 
tal regulation has changed.17 While those rights remain as the 
core of protected interests, the Court has widened the scope of 
protected interests beyond these rights? For example, one de- 
veloping class of interests that has been afforded due process 
14. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 US.  578, 589 (1897). The Court here was speaking of 
the freedom to contract as a liberty interest. The ability to contract no longer enjoys the 
exalted position that it did in the Supreme Court cases of a century ago. 
15. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 US.  525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 
236 US.  1 (1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
16. See generally Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U S .  235 (1929); Weaver v. 
Palmer Bros. Co., 270 US. 402 (1926). 
17. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining CO., 428 U.S. 1 (1976); Williamson v. Lee 
Optical, 348 U S .  483 (1955); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 US.  379 (1937). 
18. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL L W 514-15 (1978). 
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protection is governmental benefits? Only a decade ago it was 
held that governmental benefits fell within the "privileged" class 
of interests.'O They included the goods, services, and opportuni- 
ties the government provides. Because these benefits were con- 
sidered mere privileges to be granted or withheld as the govern- 
ment saw fit, no due process protections were deemed necessary 
or proper.'' However, the characterization of governmental ben- 
efits as privileges changed as it became more apparent that gov- 
ernment played an increasingly important role in ~ociety.~' For 
many people government became the provider, the employer, or 
the protector of health and welfare. Recognizing that govern- 
mental actions led to an expectation of benefits, the Court 
sought to erase the right-privilege distinction? The Court 
shifted its analysis to an examination of whether the govern- 
ment by its action created an expectation of benefits. If it had 
created an expectation of benefits, due process requirements 
would then attach where the government attempted to withhold 
or withdraw those benefits.24 Where the source of governmental 
benefits is statutory entitlement or implicit mutual understand- 
ing, due process extends to protect them, and the form of due 
process required in the circumstances becomes a matter of bal- 
ancing the interests of government and the individ~al.'~ Some 
claims of governmental benefit, however, do not invoke due pro- 
cess protecti~n;'~ public employment is such an instance.'? 
The Supreme Court in the past has balanced the interests 
of the the individual and the government employer and found 
that where the chances of further employment are not seriously 
impeded by the discharge from government employment (the 
creation of a stigma, for example) no individual expectation ex- 
19. Id. at 515. 
20. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 US.  254 (1970). 
21. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Swan, 41 Cal. 2d 546-56, 261 P.2d 261, 268 (1953). 
22. See generally Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival of Sub- 
stantive Due Process, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 261. 
23. L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 515. See Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of 
Public Employees: A Comment on the Inappropriate Uses of an Old Analogy, 16 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 751 (1969). 
24. See generally Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 
407 U.S. 67 (1972). But see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). 
25. See generally Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971). 
26. L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 510, 515. 
27. See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (Mass. 1892) 
(Holmes, J.) (employment as policeman classified as 'privilege'). 
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isted that would mandate due process pro~edures.~~ The Court 
now looks to the nature of the interest involved in a claim of 
fourteenth amendment protection and finds that public employ- 
ment involves neither a property nor a liberty interest. There- 
fore, public employment is accorded no special due process pro- 
t e c t i ~ n . ~ ~  However, where the denial of government employment 
results from an employee's exercise of other constitutionally pro- 
tected rights, the Court has rejected the premise that public em- 
ployment may be conditioned upon a relinquishment of those 
rights2O 
In 1968 in Pickering v. Board of E d u c ~ t i o n , ~ ~  the Court 
considered the issue of whether a public school teacher could be 
dismissed from his job for a public communication that was crit- 
ical of the local school board. What made this case particularly 
difficult was that the communication-a letter to the local news- 
paper-was not only critical of the school board, but contained 
erroneous statements about a very sensitive board revenue pro- 
posal that had previously failed to gain voter approval.32 The 
lower court held that the record contained substantial support 
for the school board's finding that the teacher's conduct was det- 
rimental to the interests of the school and that he therefore mer- 
ited dismi~sal.~~ On appeal, the Supreme Court recognized that 
as an employer the state has a particular interest in the speech 
of its employees. This interest is "not significantly greater," 
however, than that in the speech of the general citizenry." The 
Court also "discovered" that this was not the only interest a t  
stake in the case. The teacher also had an interest as a citizen in 
commenting on matters of public concern.s6 Thus, the Court 
identified two competing interests to be balanced: first amend- 
ment protection and orderly school administrati~n.~~ 
In striking a balance the Court first considered whether the 
speech of the teacher adversely affected harmony among fellow 
28. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 
367 U.S. 886 (1961). 
29. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 US. 564, 571 n.9, 578 (1972). 
30. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U.S. 479 (1960). 
31. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
32. Id. at 564. 
33. Id. at 565. 
34. Id. at 573. 
35. Id. at 568. 
36. Id. at 569. 
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teachers or generally disrupted faculty dis~ipline.~~ Another con- 
sideration was whether the charges contained in the speech were 
susceptible of refutation or whether they were of such a nature 
that they could not be countered or rebutted by the board.38 
These two considerations support the collectivist goal of the ad- 
ministration and faculty, that goal being the education of stu- 
dents. This goal might be subverted if one teacher was allowed 
to undermine the faculty's loyalty to that goal or to undermine 
the community support of the faculty and administration with 
his misstatements. The Court, therefore, was concerned that the 
state's interest be weighted heavily where it can be shown that 
the school's interest would be harmed by the individual. 
In Pickering, a collectivist goal came into apparent conflict 
with the individual rights of the teacher. The teacher expressed 
his opinion about the operation of his school in a letter to a 
newspaper. A teacher's interest in expressing his opinion clearly 
coincides with the public interest in free and open debate about 
matters of public concern. These first amendment rights are 
possessed by each citizen, and because of their great value, they 
are protected even to the point of false or malicious speech that 
results in actual harm. Accordingly, the Court set forth the criti- 
cal test on which the analysis in Pickering turns: Where an em- 
ployee speaks as a citizen on matters of public interest and "the 
fact of employment is only tangentially and insubstantially in- 
volved in the subject matter of the public communication made 
by the teacher, . . . it is necessary to regard the teacher as the 
member of the general public which he seeks to be."ss If the 
teacher is viewed as a public citizen, the board's interest be- 
comes not that of maintaining an effective school system, but an 
interest no greater than if any other citizen had written a let- 
ter.'O But if the teacher is viewed as speaking as an employee, 
the interest of the board becomes far greater. Pickering tells us 
that only beyond the threshold question of characterizing the 
person as teacher instead of citizen does the board's concern for 
confidentiality, trust, harmony, and effectiveness come into play. 
In this case, the teacher was found to have written the letter in 
his role as a citizen, and in the absence of a showing that false 
statements were knowingly and recklessly made, the teacher's 
37. Id. at 569-70. 
38. Id. at 572. 
39. Id. at 574. 
40. Id. at 573. 
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employment could not be conditioned on his exercise of pro- 
tected rights." 
It is important to note that in Pickering, where the school 
board was required by state law to hold dismissal hearings:" the 
Court left unconsidered the ancillary procedural due process is- 
sues that are characteristic of teacher dismissal actions. The Su- 
preme Court faced these procedural due process issues in two 
major companion cases decided four years after Pickering: 
Board of Regents v. Roth" and Perry v. Sindermann." Al- 
though the Court applied the same principles to these factually 
similar cases, it reached different conclusions. 
Both Roth and Perry involved university faculty members 
not being rehired at the expiration of their contracts? These 
faculty members were not permitted hearings and were not 
given statements of the reasons for their dismissal. In analyzing 
these cases, the Court first defined property as something one 
already posse~ses.'~ It then asserted that the concept of property 
embodies tangible as well as intangible things." Using property 
interests as the standard, the Court in Roth found no basis for 
any expectation that employment would c~ntinue.'~ But in 
Sindermann, the Court found a basis for this e~pectation.'~ The 
teacher in Sindermann worked for a university with a tacit ten- 
ure system." The Court took a comprehensive view of the fac- 
tual situation from which the case arose and was willing to look 
beyond the terms of the teacher's present contract in defining 
41. Id. at  574. 
42. Id. at  566. 
43. 408 US. 564 (1972). 
44. 408 US. 593 (1972). 
45. Roth had been hired as an assistant professor of political science at  Wisconsin 
State University under a contract extending from September 1, 1968 to June 31, 1969. 
Although a Wisconsin statute granted tenure after four one-year contracts, no statutory 
or administrative standards for reemployment had been adopted, which meant that the 
standard for rehiring was left to the discretion of the university administration. Roth 
was given notice prior to the expiration of his contract, but was not granted a hearing. 
Sindermann had taught under year-to-year contracts at  Odessa Junior College in Texas. 
During his fourth year, he had become head of the local teachers association which a t  
that time was engaged in a controversy with the board of regents. After his fourth year, 
on the basis of insubordination, he was not rehired. He was given neither a statement of 
reasons nor a hearing. See 408 US. a t  566-68. 
46. Id. at 576. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 578. 
49. 408 US. at 599, 600. 
50. Id. 
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reasonable expectations. On the other hand, the teacher in Roth 
worked under a system in which no understanding of tenure ex- 
isted. A mere subjective expectation of continued benefits on the 
part of the teacher was not sufficient in the Court's view to con- 
stitute a property interest; rather, this expectation was to be 
supported by objective factual criteria adduced from the partic- 
ular employment s i t u a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
In light of these cases, constitutional analysis in the area of 
public school employment must be viewed as following two lines. 
A successful claim of constitutionally protected rights based on 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment must be 
preceded by a showing of a property interest in employment 
arising from either a contract-tenure right to continued employ- 
ment or from an implied contractual right or mutual under- 
standing of continued employment. On the other hand, a claim 
of constitutionally protected interests based on first amendment 
rights does not require a property interest analysis. A denial of 
continued employment based on the exercise of first amendment 
freedoms is constitutionally prohibited. These are the principles 
that emanated from Pickering, Roth, and Perry, and constituted 
the base upon which Mt. Healthy came before the Supreme 
Court in 1977. 
IV. WHAT IS A CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION? 
Having considered the cases that it is based upon, we may 
view the Mt. Healthy case from first amendment and fourteenth 
amendment perspectives. These two perspectives coincide with 
the two lines of cases leading up to Mt. Healthy. 
A. The First Amendment Perspective 
When the Supreme Court decided Mt. Healthy, it accepted 
as true a lower court finding that Mr. Doyle's conduct was con- 
stitutionally protected. What the Court did not do was find that 
this fact alone was sufficient to grant relief. There must be a test 
in constitutional cases to distinguish "between a result caused 
by a constitutional violation and one not so caused."62 The test 
the Court developed required the plaintiff to show that his con- 
duct was constitutionally protected and that it constituted the 
51. 408 U.S. at 577. 
52. 429 U.S. 274, 286. 
2551 TEACHER DISMISSAL 265 
motivating factor for the government's adverse decision. If the 
plaintiff meets his burden, it then becomes the government's 
burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
same decision would have been reached in any event? 
In many instances it has not proven difficult for courts to 
determine when a first amendment violation has occurred: the 
parade permit was denied, the protestor was jailed, or the pam- 
phleteer was fined. But in more recent rumblings emanating 
from the Burger Court, the focus has shifted from looking solely 
at the result of a state's action to also reviewing the reasons why 
those actions were undertaken? It now appears that results, 
and the reasons for the results, will serve evidentiary functions 
in determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred. 
Before Mt. Healthy, once a first amendment violation was 
found, the Court proceeded no further in its ana lys i~ .~~  Rather, 
freedom of speech, considered by the Court to be the core of all 
freedoms, was surrounded by stringent protections, which, when 
violated, supported awards of at least nominal damages, even 
where no actual harm could be shown?There were those who 
would have protected first amendment rights at nearly any 
cost-the late Justice Hugo Black being the prime example." 
But, such a position has been abandoned for a new position in 
which first amendment rights are not seen as absolute; the Court 
now perceives other considerations as also important. This con- 
temporary perception of competing values required courts to de- 
fine and then to balance the various interests at stake in a law- 
suit. How the interests are defined in any given situation will, to 
a great extent, determine the balance attained. If the speech of 
the teacher is defined as further from the core of first amend- 
ment rights, the state's interest in prohibiting the speech corre- 
spondingly increases. This concept was explored by Justice 
Rehnquist four years before his opinion in Mt. Healthy when he 
stated: "The government as employer or school administrator 
53. Id. at 287. 
54. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229 (1976); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
55. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 
444 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
56. See, e-g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978). But cf. New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (damages only recoverable when "actual malice" 
shown). 
57. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (Black, J., 
concurring). 
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may impose upon employees and students reasonable regula- 
tions that would be impermissible if imposed by the government 
upon all  citizen^."^^ 
Whether or not the Court is in fact adopting the earlier 
Rehnquist view, just how much protection teachers' speech lying 
further from the "core" of protected activities requires appears 
to remain an unanswered question. What is more certain after 
Mt. Healthy, however, is that a constitutional violation is not 
evidenced by any particular result of the state's response to ar- 
guably protected conduct. Rather, it is the intent from which a 
result is produced that becomes evidence of a constitutional 
violation. 
Because of the complexity of the considerations in retalia- 
tory discharge cases, it is difficult to determine what standard of 
review the Court should adopt. A strict scrutiny standard is in- 
apposite, because the inquiry is not simply definitional-that is, 
whether free speech conduct exists to make any discharge ille- 
gitimate-but rather, the inquiry involves the balancing of the 
role of that conduct in the decisionmaking with the role of all 
other actual grounds upon which the discharge may be legiti- 
mately based. Accordingly, the Court has not required a strict 
scrutiny standard of review in such cases." The state may have 
many legitimate reasons for discharging an employee; to require 
the state to show a compelling state interest at the mere sugges- 
tion that constitutionally protected conduct is involved places 
an undue burden on the s ta tdo  At the same time it must be 
recognized that to require courts to apply only a rational basis 
standard of review may legitimatize a school board action that 
can be justified by pointing to any conceivable reason for the 
action.61 The Mt. Healthy standard falls between these two ex- 
tremes. It gives judicial imprimatur only to those decisions of 
the state that can be justified on grounds wholly independent of 
any constitutional activity. 
Even though Mt. Healthy was a unanimous opinion, the 
concept of the proper standard of review must be reconciled 
58. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 203 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). See also 
Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973). 
59. Comment, Proof of Racially Discriminatory Purpose under the Equal Protec- 
tion Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Williamsburgh, 
12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 725, 750 (1977). 
60. Id. 
61. See id. at 729. 
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with the various philosophies present on the Court. One com- 
mentator has suggested that in the view of some of the Justices, 
the Mt. Healthy approach places a heavy burden on the defen- 
dant to show that any interference with constitutionally pro- 
tected rights is harmless in that the same decision to discharge 
would have been reached in any eventqq In support of this pro- 
position is the fact that the Mt. Healthy test places the defen- 
dant's proof at a preponderance-of-the-evidence level while not 
requiring the plaintiff to prove the motivating factor by any 
such standard. 
Notwithstanding its effect on appellate review, the major ef- 
fect of Mt. Healthy will be felt, and struggled with, in the trial 
courts. Mt. Healthy provides little guidance to these lower 
courts on the mount and type of evidence required of the plain- 
tiff to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Nothing in Mt. 
Healthy suggests what kinds of evidence will be deemed proba- 
tive of the defendant's motivations, or whether the subjective 
feelings of the defendant are necessary elements of proof. The 
requirement that the plaintiff produce evidence showing the mo- 
tivating factors for the state's action is a higher threshold bur- 
den than was required before Mt. Healthy. Whether this burden 
is met will be for the judge's determination and failure to meet 
it may lead to a directed verdict for the defendant. 
The lower courts may derive some guidance by examining a 
similar type of analysis in a line of equal protection cases 
brought under the Civil Rights Act where the Supreme Court 
has required a showing of discriminatory purpose on the part 
of the state in order to find an actionable constitutional viola- 
tion? This requirement may be compared to the motivating fac- 
tor for state action in discharge cases.64 In order to determine 
whether a discriminatory purpose on the part of the state did 
exist, the courts have employed various tests, and the results 
have largely depended on the test utilized.@' The tests range 
from those favorable to the plaintiffs burden of proof to those 
difficult of proof, absent direct evidence of the state's discrimi- 
natory p~rpose.~@ 
62. Id. at 751-52. 
63. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 
535 (1972); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
64. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973). 
65. See Comment, supra note 59 at 731. 
66. Four readily ascertainable tests have been used: (1) discriminatory purpose 
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Another source of guidance in applying the Mt. Healthy 
test is found in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp." which was decided the same term 
as Mt. Healthy. That case involved racial discrimination by the 
selective application of local zoning ordinances. The Court listed 
four factors that may be probative of discriminatory purpose: (1) 
the disproportionate impact of official action, (2) the historical 
impact of the decision, (3) the sequence of eve& leading to the 
decision, and (4) the administrative record of the decision.68 Of 
these four factors, the last two may be more reliable indicators 
of motivation in a case like Mt. Healthy. This may be particu- 
larly true when viewing the third factor, which requires an eval- 
uation of the sequence of events leading to a decision, for it may 
be possible to show by such an inquiry that the defendant's ver- 
sion of the elements of the decision are mere pretense? 
A contrary application of the Court's standard in Mt. 
Healthy would presume that the state's decision rested on legiti- 
mate grounds. The plaintiff, therefore, would need to present a 
prima facie case showing that the protected conduct was the mo- 
tivating factor behind the action before the burden would shift 
to the defendant. 
At the moment,' Mt. Healthy must be viewed as a deviation 
from prior decisions. While stating the rule enunciated in Pick- 
en'ng, that an employment decision may not be based on consti- 
tutionally protected conduct, Mt. Healthy, by its causation test, 
attempts to fill a perceived pitfall in so simple an analysis. The 
inherent problem in a balancing of interests is that it requires 
the judiciary to look deeply into the policies lurking behind 
those interests and to make certain judgments about the merits 
of those policies. 
Interestingly, some federal circuit and district court deci- 
sions prior to Mt. Healthy appeared to be expanding the scope 
of legitimate state action by developing approaches similar to 
demonstrated by the reasonably foreseeable adverse results of a governmental action; (2) 
proof of subjective motivation; (3) discriminatory purpose as evidenced by the govern- 
ment's actions taken as a whole; and, (4) presumptive discriminatory purpose which the 
government may rebut with a showing of legitimate motivation. Id. at 732-37. 
67. 429 US. 252 (1977). 
68. Id. at 265-68. 
69. See DuRoss, Toward Rationality in Discriminatory Discharge Cases: The Im- 
pact of Mt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle Upon the NLRA, 66 GEO. L.J. 1109, 
1114 (1978). 
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the one later adopted by the Supreme Court in Mt. H e ~ l t h y . ~ ~  
An underlying concern of those courts was the role of federal 
courts in local school board policy? Whether that concern rep- 
resents a feeling that federal courts should be hesitant in inter- 
fering with those traditionally local matters, or whether it repre- 
sents a broader apprehension of the federal courts' intervention 
into every aspect of modern life, is unknown. 
B. The Fourteenth Amendment Perspective 
While the decision in Mt. Healthy altered the analysis of 
the first amendment issues involved, it added little to the Roth- 
Sindermann procedural due process requirements for teacher 
dismissal. Because the teacher in Mt. Healthy had no tenure 
rights, express or implied, the Court reiterated the traditional 
view that Doyle had no right to a hearing before his di~rnissal.~' 
In the Court's view it was unnecessary to discuss the require- 
ment of a hearing where a claimant asserts constitutionally pro- 
tected conduct as the grounds of dismissal. Roth and 
Sindermann found that the interest in holding a teaching posi- 
tion at a state university did not, by itself, embody a free speech 
interest, and that the mere assertion of such an interest does not 
demand due process safeguards.?' Without further Court consid- 
eration of these stated premises, the Roth-Sindermann prece- 
dent would still seem to apply. One subsequent Supreme Court 
case, Bishop v. Wood," supports this proposition. This case in- 
volved a public employee's-though not a teacher's-right to a 
hearing before dismissal. The Court in Bishop found an insuffi- 
cient expectation of continued employment to violate fourteenth 
amendment protections of liberty or property  interest^.^^ 
Many policy reasons have been postulated in support of 
some form of due process procedures to be required in all in- 
stances of adverse government action, to some extent echoing 
the dissenting opinions of Roth and Sindermann. The practical 
70. See Rarnpey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 
(1975) (using a causation test, the court found that interference with university faculty's 
constitutional rights is prohibited). 
71. See, e.g., Starsky v. Williams, 353 F. Supp. 900, 916 (D. Ariz. 1972). 
72. 429 U.S. at 283. 
73. 408 U.S. 564, 575 n.14. 
74. 426 U.S. 341 (1976). 
75. Id. at 347. See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974) (statutory right 
may be directly limited by the same statute). 
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effect of the Mt. Healthy decision is to further confuse the due 
process requirements in teacher dismissal actions. Before al- 
lowing this confusion to be perpetuated in future decisions, the 
importance of due process should be reexamined. Due process 
assures reasoned decisionmaking by forcing each official to artic- 
ulate the bases of any decision. It provides a forum for facts and 
the inferences to be drawn from those facts, thereby allowing 
discovery of any erroneous bases for the decision. The procedure 
may also allow the affected party an opportunity to speak for his 
own cause. 
In education, the concept of academic freedom has been 
viewed as an important policy concern. It has received much at- 
tention by educators, legislators, and judges, and yet it has not 
been considered by the Court as representing an independent 
liberty intere~t.'~ Therefore, due process requirements have been 
seen as needed protection for the vitality of academic freedom. 
It is important to realize. that Mt. Healthy's impact may be 
wider ranging, particularly when considering due process con- 
cerns, than even the Court originally contemplated. 
V. THE IMPACT OF Mt. Healthy 
Finally, we must look beyond Mt. Healthy and assess its 
impact on subsequent rulings. The Supreme Court has cited Mt. 
Healthy in a variety of contexts since it was decided in 1977.77 
Although these cases do not point to a single proposition con- 
cerning Mt. Healthy, certain items of a constitutional dimension 
can be gleaned from them. In cases ranging from school desegre- 
gationla to the sixth amendment right to a jury trial," the Court 
has looked to Mt. Healthy to support two areas of analysis. 
Those areas are the factors of causation when a claimed harm is 
said to result from a constitutional violation and the intertwined 
question of discriminatory purpose.80 Both areas relate to the 
question previously presented in this discussion: When does a 
76. Brown, Tenure Rights in Contractual and Constitutional Context, 6 J.L. & 
EDUC. 279, 296-97. 
77. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 700 n.27 (1979); Lake Country 
Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 398, 401 (1979); Regents 
of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 321 (1978); Andrus v. Charleston Stone 
Products Co., 436 U.S. 604, 607 n.6 (1978). 
78. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465 n.13 (1979). 
79. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 368 n.26 (1979). 
80. See East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriquez, 431 U.S. 395, 404 n.9 
(1977). 
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constitutional violation occur? The Supreme Court in these 
cases appears to reaffirm its opinion in Mt. Healthy that a direct 
causal connection between the intent to violate a protected right 
and the harm complained of are necessary elements of such a 
claim. 
In the area of education, the Supreme Court has decided 
two major cases dealing with teachers' first and fourteenth 
amendments rights that refer to Mt. Healthy. In Ambach u. 
N o r w i ~ k , ~ ~  the Court in a five to four decision that relied on Mt. 
Healthy for support held that teaching is not a liberty interest 
protected by the fourteenth amendment.82 At issue in that case 
was a New York State law that required state certification to 
teach, but which also forbade certification of persons who were 
not citizens of the United States. The Court's reasoning pro- 
ceeded from the premise that teaching is entwined with the fun- 
damental function of government to educate its citizens. The 
Court, using only a rational basis standard of review for the 
state's action, found in the state's goal to promote civic under- 
standing a legitimate justification for restricting teaching to only 
United States citizens. Because the state could point to a legiti- 
mate rationale for its action, the teacher's interest in pursuing 
his profession was outweighed. 
The second and perhaps most significant case was Giuhan v. 
Western Line Consolidated School D i s t r i ~ t . ~ ~  There the Su- 
preme Court reversed a circuit court ruling that ostensibly used 
Mt. Healthy as support for its holding that private conversa- 
tions between a teacher and a principal are not protected under 
the first amendment. The Court restated the test as, "once the 
employee has shown that his constitutionally protected conduct 
played a 'substantial' role in the employer's decision not to re- 
hire him, the employer is entitled to show 'by a preponderance 
of evidence' that it would have reached the same decis i~n."~~ It 
is interesting to note Mr. Justice Rehnquist's choice of words. In 
Mt. Healthy, the Court found that a "substantial role" was a 
test too narrow in focus, and thus used "motivating factor." But 
in Givhan, the Court does not mention motivating factor, in- 
serting in its place the once rejected "substantial role" notion. 
Whether it is a change in the application of the plaintiffs bur- 
81. 441 U.S. 68 (1979). 
82. See id. at 79 & n.lO. 
83. 439 U.S. 410 (1979). 
84. Id. at 416. 
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den of proof or a slip of the pen is uncertain? 
The substantive ruling in Mt. Healthy has been paid scant 
attention in the lower federal courts. Rather, the opinion has 
been cited for its ruling regarding 28 U.S.C. $ 1331(a) jurisdic- 
t i ~ n ? ~  and its discussion of the eleventh amendment." In those 
cases that have used Mt.  Healthy for its substantive holding in 
the public educational context, the result has depended on the 
court's perception of the Mt. Healthy test. For example, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had used a "partial retaliation" 
test in the past and found Mt. Healthy as support for its contin- 
ued use.88 
A case that arose in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reached the Supreme Court some months after the Mt. Healthy 
decision; it was therefore remanded for consideration in light of 
that case9 The Ninth Circuit in a per curiam opinion stated 
that the jury as trier of fact was to make the determination 
whether the same decision of the school district would have been 
made in the absence of the constitutionally protected conduct. 
The court refused to disturb the jury's finding in favor of the 
teacher and thereby rearmed its prior opinion?O 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Our review of Mt. Healthy leaves one question: What does 
the case portend for the school administrator on the firing line? 
Certainly it means that school administrators have greater flex- 
ibility in dismissal cases that are entangled with constitutional 
and nonconstitutional issues. In a very real sense, constitution- 
ally protected conduct cannot now be raised as an absolute 
shield to possible adverse actions. Although this result can give 
some solace to harassed school administrators, they still bear a 
substantial burden where the dismissal reasons are mixed. When 
coupled with due process requirements, this burden should indi- 
85. This change, or slip of the pen, has been noted in a circuit court decision. See 
Rosaly v. Ignacio, 593 F.2d 145, 149 (1st Cir. 1979). 
86. See O'Grady v. City of Montpelier, 573 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1978); Arthur v. Ny- 
quist, 573 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1978). 
87. See Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1977); Owen v. City of Indepen- 
dence, 560 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1977). 
88. See Carmichael v. Chambers County Bd. of Educ., 581 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1978). 
89. See Murray v. Wagle, 431 U.S. 935 (1977). 
90. See Wagle v. Murray, 560 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1977). 
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cate to those who originally hailed the case that Mt. Healthy is 
not a return to the "good old days." 
